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Abstract—This paper considers the real-time detection of
anomalies in high-dimensional systems. The goal is to detect
anomalies quickly and accurately so that the appropriate coun-
termeasures could be taken in time, before the system possibly
gets harmed. We propose a sequential and multivariate anomaly
detection method that scales well to high-dimensional datasets.
The proposed method follows a nonparametric, i.e., data-driven,
and semi-supervised approach, i.e., trains only on nominal data.
Thus, it is applicable to a wide range of applications and
data types. Thanks to its multivariate nature, it can quickly
and accurately detect challenging anomalies, such as changes
in the correlation structure and stealth low-rate cyberattacks.
Its asymptotic optimality and computational complexity are
comprehensively analyzed. In conjunction with the detection
method, an effective technique for localizing the anomalous data
dimensions is also proposed. We further extend the proposed
detection and localization methods to a supervised setup where
an additional anomaly dataset is available, and combine the
proposed semi-supervised and supervised algorithms to obtain an
online learning algorithm under the semi-supervised framework.
The practical use of proposed algorithms are demonstrated in
DDoS attack mitigation, and their performances are evaluated
using a real IoT-botnet dataset and simulations.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, anomaly localization, online
learning, nonparametric methods, DDoS attack mitigation
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection is an important problem dealing with
the detection of abnormal data patterns [1]. It has applications
in a variety of different domains, such as cybersecurity [2],
medical health care [3], quality control, etc. The importance
of anomaly detection lies in the fact that an anomaly in the
observation data may be a sign of an unwanted event such
as failure, malicious activity, etc. in the underlying system.
Therefore, accurate detection of such data patterns will allow
proper countermeasures to be taken by the domain specialist
to counteract any possible harm. To name a few examples, an
anomaly in the MRI image could be due to the presence of a
malignant tumor in the brain; and anomalous observations in
the network traffic data could mean that the network is under
a cyber-attack.
The advances in various technologies such as Internet-of-
Things (IoT) devices and sensors, and wireless communi-
cations, have enabled the real-time monitoring of systems
for detecting events of interest. In many modern and com-
plex systems such as IoT networks, network-wide traffic
monitoring systems, environmental monitoring systems, etc.
massive amounts of heterogeneous data are generated, which
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require real-time processing for timely detection of anoma-
lous events. As an example, automated vehicles or advanced
driver-assistance systems today are equipped with modules
comprising a large number of sensors and actuators for control
and safety purposes. Due to the catastrophic consequences
of any fault in perceiving the environment or failure in a
component of the system, as well as being compromised by
hackers, it is crucial to preserve the robustness of the vehicle.
To this end, the high-dimensional measurements from sensors
need to be monitored and analyzed in real-time to detect
anomalies such as sudden increase of speed, abnormal petrol
consumption, anomalies in radar sensors and camera sensing,
etc. [4]. Accurate and light-weight anomaly detection methods
that can scale well to large systems are needed to be able to
address such big data challenges in real-time.
Anomaly detection methods on univariate data streams have
been studied thoroughly in the literature. However, little work
has been done on multivariate anomaly detection, which has
the potential to achieve quicker and more accurate detec-
tion than univariate anomaly detection by capturing more
anomaly evidence in the interactions between system dimen-
sions. Statistical approaches to anomaly detection assume
anomaly to be a change in the probability distribution of
the observations, such as a change in the mean, variance, or
correlation structure between the data-streams. One important
application for detecting changes in the correlation structures
is finance, where the correlation structures between high-
dimensional processes modeling the exchange rates and market
indexes are important for the right choice of asset allocation in
portfolio [5]. Furthermore, in social networks, it is important
to detect abrupt changes in interactions between the nodes;
and in communication networks, it is of interest to detect
highly correlated traffic in a network [6]. Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks to power grid through synchronous
switching on/off of high-wattage IoT devices is another exam-
ple where anomaly is manifested in correlations [7]. Detection
of change in correlation structure requires the joint monitoring
and multivariate analysis of the data-streams, which in turn,
leads to the high-dimensionality challenge. To overcome this
challenge, a desired anomaly detection technique needs to be
scalable to high-dimensional data in real time.
Anomaly detection in many systems such as fraud detection
could be the ultimate goal, however, in many scenarios, such
as diagnosis systems (e.g., spacecraft monitoring system [8])
and cybersecurity, it is highly important to provide a degree of
interpretation about the detected issue in the system and how
to mitigate it. Considering the potential damages caused by
failure in mitigation of unexpected behaviors, such as cyber-
attacks, detecting anomalies without providing any further
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2information explaining where the anomaly has happened is
of limited value to the engineers.
Motivated by the aforementioned challenges, we investigate
an online multivariate anomaly detection and localization
technique which is simple enough to handle high-dimensional
and heterogeneous data in real-time.
A. Related Works
The problem of anomaly detection has been an important
subject of study in several research communities such as
statistics, signal processing, machine learning, information
theory, data mining, etc. either specifically for an application
domain or as a generic method. To name a few, an SVM
classification approach for anomaly detection was proposed
in [9]; several information theoretic measures were proposed
in [10] for the intrusion detection problem; and two new
information metrics for DDoS attack detection was introduced
in [2]. Due to the challenging nature of the problem and
considering the challenges posed by today’s technological
advances such as big data problems, there is still a need for
reconsidering the anomaly detection problem.
Sequential anomaly detection techniques, compared to the
outlier detection techniques [1], take also the history of ob-
servations into account rather than only the new observations.
Sequential techniques are more suitable for real-time systems
where timely and accurate detection of anomalies is important.
The Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) detector [11] is a well-
known sequential change detection technique that assumes
probabilistic models for nominal and anomalous data points,
and computes the cumulative log-likelihood-ratio (LLR) over
time, declaring anomaly if the statistic exceeds a predefined
threshold. The accuracy of assumed models as well as the
estimated parameters are the key factors in the performance
of CUSUM and more generally parametric methods. CUSUM
is minimax optimum under the condition that the probability
distributions before and after the change are completely known
[12]. However, in many real-world applications having a priori
knowledge about the underlying distributions is not possi-
ble. Estimating the probability distributions quickly becomes
intractable for high-dimensional data, which includes many
unknowns such as the anomaly onset time, the subset of
anomalous dimensions, etc., in addition to the parameters
of the nominal and anomalous models. To tackle with this
complexity, [13] proposed a relaxed version of CUSUM in
which each data stream is assumed to be independent of others.
However, this univariate method is not suitable for detecting
changes in the correlation between data streams. A sequential
test for detecting changes in the correlation between variables,
as well as localizing the highly correlated variables, in high-
dimensional data streams has been proposed in [14]. This is a
parametric method based on the assumption that the observed
vectors are multivariate Gaussian distributed. It is proposed
solely for the detection of correlation change between data-
streams and does not generalize to other changes in the dis-
tribution. In this paper, we are interested in detecting general
changes in unknown distributions, including the changes in
correlation structure.
k-nearest-neighbor (kNN) distance-based methods are geo-
metric methods that are based on the assumption that anoma-
lous data instances occur far from the nominal instances.
For instance, [15] and [16] have proposed nonparametric
outlier detection techniques based on the minimum volume set
(MVS) of the nominal data. MVS corresponds to the region
of greatest probability density with minimum data volume and
is known to be useful for anomaly detection [17] based on
the assumption that anomalies occur in the less concentrated
regions of the nominal dataset. These nonparametric outlier
detection methods estimate the MVS of nominal training sam-
ples using kNN graphs, and declare a data point as anomalous
if it lies outside the MVS. Despite being scalable to high-
dimensional and heterogeneous data, they do not consider the
temporal anomaly information, and thus are prone to higher
false alarm rates compared to sequential anomaly detection
methods. Similarly, [18] proposed a kNN graph-based method
that computes an anomaly score for each observation and
declares an anomaly by thresholding the score value. In this
paper, as opposed to the outlier detection methods which treat
a single outlier as an anomaly, we consider an anomaly to
consist of persistent outliers and investigate sequential and
nonparametric detection of such anomalies using the temporal
information in data streams. Recently, [19] proposed a non-
parametric kNN-based sequential anomaly detection method
for multivariate observations. This method computes the test
statistic based on the number of kNN edges at different
splitting points within a window and stops the test whenever
the test statistics exceed a threshold. Due to its window-
based nature this method has inherent limitations in achieving
small detection delays. It also recomputes the kNN graphs at
every time instance and for every splitting point, therefore
its computational complexity is note suitable for real-time
applications. In another recent work, [20] proposed a distance-
based and CUSUM-like change detection method for attributed
graphs. Attributed graphs are first mapped into numeric vec-
tors, and then the distance between the mean response of an
observation window and the mean response of the training
data are computed via a CUSUM-like sequential algorithm.
In addition to the limitations arising from the window-based
nature of the method, the local relations between samples are
disregarded due to considering only the mean response of the
training set. As a result, in cases where training data has a
multimodal distribution, this method will not be effective. As
compared to [20], we take into account the local relations
between the data instances.
B. Contributions
In this paper, aiming at timely and accurate detection of
anomalies in high-dimensional systems we propose two vari-
ations of a kNN-based sequential anomaly detection method,
as well as a unified framework that combines the advantages
of both methods. In summary, our contributions in this paper
are as follows:
• A framework for multivariate, data-driven and sequential
detection of anomalies in high-dimensional systems is
proposed for both semi-supervised and supervised set-
3tings depending on the availability of labeled data. Com-
bining the advantages of supervised and semi-supervised
settings, we further introduce an online learning scheme
which can effectively detect both known and unknown
anomaly types by incorporating the newly detected
anomalies into the training set.
• Asymptotic optimality of the proposed detection meth-
ods in the minimax sense is shown, and comprehensive
analysis for computational complexity is provided.
• An anomaly localization technique to identify the prob-
lematic data dimensions is also proposed based on the
proposed detection methods.
• The practicality of the proposed anomaly detection and
localization methods is demonstrated on mitigating DDoS
attacks through simulations and a real dataset.
C. Organization and Notations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the mathematical formulation of the considered anomaly de-
tection problem and the relevant background information are
provided. We present the proposed anomaly detection and
localization methods in Sections III and IV. Section V presents
the application of our proposed methods in DDoS attack
mitigation. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
Vectors and matrices are represented by boldface lowercase
and uppercase letters, respectively. Script letters denote sets,
e.g., X . Vectors are organized in a column unless otherwise
stated. Probability and expectation are denoted with P and E,
respectively.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Suppose that a system is observed through d-dimensional
observations Xt = {x1,x2, . . . ,xt} in time. The objective is
to detect an anomaly occurring at an unknown time τ as
soon as possible while satisfying a false alarm constraint. This
problem can be formulated as a change detection problem as
follows:
f = f0, t < τ, f = f1( 6= f0), t ≥ τ, (1)
where f is the true probability distribution of observations, f0
and f1 are the nominal and anomaly probability distributions,
respectively. The objective of the problem is to find the
anomaly time T that minimizes the average detection delay
while satisfying a false alarm constraint, i.e.,
inf
T
Eτ [(T − τ)+] subject to E∞[T ] ≥ β, (2)
where Eτ represents the expectation given that change occurs
at τ , (.)+ = max(., 0), and E∞ denotes the expectation given
that no change occurs, i.e., the expectation of false alarm
period.
Lorden’s minimax problem is a commonly used version of
the above problem [21], in which the goal is to minimize the
worst-case average detection delay subject to a false alarm
constraint:
inf
T
sup
τ
ess sup
Xτ
Eτ [(T − τ)+|Xτ ] s.t. E∞[T ] ≥ β, (3)
where “ess sup” denotes essential supremum which is equiv-
alent to supremum in practice. In simple words, the minimax
criterion minimizes the average detection delay for the least
favorable change-point and the least favorable history of
measurements up to the change-point while the average false
alarm period is lower bounded by β.
The CUSUM test provides the optimum solution to the
minimax problem [12], given by (3):
St = max{0, St−1 + `t},
Tc = inf{t : St ≥ hc},
(4)
where Tc is the stopping time, `t = log
f1(xt)
f0(xt)
is the log-
likelihood ratio at time t, S0 = 0, and hc is a decision
threshold, selected in a way to satisfy a given false alarm
constraint. Considering `t as a statistical evidence for anomaly
the CUSUM algorithm continues accumulating it, and declares
an anomaly the first time the accumulated evidence St exceeds
a threshold hc, that is chosen sufficiently large for reliable
detection. CUSUM requires the complete knowledge of the
probability distributions f0 and f1. However, in real-world
applications, the true probability distributions are typically
unknown. Even when f0 and f1 are known up to their param-
eters, and the parameters are estimated using the maximum
likelihood approach, the procedure known as Generalized
CUSUM (G-CUSUM) achieves only asymptotic optimality.
Moreover, CUSUM and in general parametric methods are
limited to the detection of certain anomaly types whose true
probability distribution matches the assumed f1 well.
In high-dimensional problems that require multivariate anal-
ysis, estimating the nominal probability distribution is typi-
cally not tractable, especially when the data dimensions are
heterogeneous, e.g., environmental sensor data consisting of
wind speed, direction, air temperature, pressure, humidity,
weather condition (whether it is rainy, sunny or cloudy),
etc. Considering the wide range of possible anomalies it is
even more intractable to estimate the anomaly probability
distribution. In such problems, knowing the probability distri-
butions and parameters is highly complicated if not impossible,
limiting the applicability of CUSUM and parametric methods
in general.
III. PROPOSED DETECTION METHODS
We recently proposed a kNN-based sequential anomaly
detection method called Online Discrepancy Test (ODIT) [22],
and applied it to cyber-attack detection in smart grid [23]
and in intelligent transportation systems [24]. In this section,
we (i) first elaborate on the motivation behind ODIT, (ii)
then present a modification for ODIT to prove its asymptotic
optimality in the minimax sense under certain conditions,
(iii) extensively analyze its computational complexity, (iv)
propose an extension of ODIT for the cases where training
data is available for some anomaly settings, (v) introduce a
unified framework for the proposed ODIT detectors, (vi) and
finally provide a simulation study to exemplify the timely
and accurate detection by the proposed detectors under a
challenging scenario in which univariate methods fail.
4The rationale behind using kNN distance for anomaly de-
tection is the similarity between the inverse kNN distance and
likelihood. Specifically, for f(xi) ≥ f(xj), xi,xj ∈ X , it is
expected that the distance gk(xi) of xi to its kth nearest neigh-
bor in X is smaller than that of xj . This probability increases
with the size of X , i.e., lim|X |→∞ P (gk(xi) ≤ gk(xj)) = 1.
This in turn provides grounds for using the difference of kNN
distances in ODIT to approximate the log-likelihood ratio `t.
The similarity between the likelihood of data points and
the inverse kNN distance is shown in Fig. 1 for several
distributions. We consider Gaussian, Poisson and multinomial
distributions to illustrate the similarity of 1/gk(x) and f(x)
for three disparate data types, real-valued numeric, integer-
valued numeric and categorical, respectively. The inverse kNN
distance graphs are scaled down to match the likelihood figure
for the purpose of visualization. As shown in Fig. 1(a) with
|X | = 106, the inverse of kNN distance approximates the like-
lihood very well for the standard Gaussian random variable.
Despite some discrepancy for the Poisson and multinomial
cases due to the discreteness of these random variables, it
may still serve well the purpose of approximating the log-
likelihood ratio. For these discrete cases, to avoid zero kNN
distance we consider much smaller number of data points,
10 and 50 for Poisson and multinomial, respectively. Fig.
1(b) and (c) are obtained by averaging over 5 × 105 and
104 trials, respectively. In order to show the similarity for
a more complex distribution, in Fig. 1(d) we consider a two-
dimensional vector of a categorical random variable and a real-
valued random variable with arbitrary distribution and 104 data
points.
A. Online Discrepancy Test (ODIT)
The overview of the ODIT detector is given in Fig. 2. In
the training phase, assuming a training set XN consisting of
N nominal data instances, it firstly partitions XN into two
sets XN1 and XN2 , where N1 + N2 = N , for computational
efficiency as in the bipartite GEM algorithm [16]. Then, using
the kNN distances {gk(xm)} between each node xm ∈ XN1
and its k nearest neighbors in XN2 ODIT finds an estimate
Ωˆα for the minimum volume set (MVS) Ωα given by
Ωα = argmin
A
∫
A
dx s.t.
∫
A
f0(x)dx ≥ 1− α, (5)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a significance level, e.g., 0.05. Ωα
represents the most compact set of observations under nominal
operation while its complement Ωα corresponds to the tail
events (i.e., outliers) under nominal operation at significance
level α. Then, in the test phase, it compares the kNN distances
gk(x) between a test data instance x and its k nearest neigh-
bors in X2 with Ωˆα to compute a negative/positive anomaly
evidence for anomaly x and accumulates it over time for
reliable detection. Roughly, the greater gk(x) is, the less likely
x comes from the same distribution f0 as the nominal points.
The estimate Ωˆα provides a reference to evaluate gk(x) and
compute the negative/positive anomaly evidence for x.
(a) Standard Gaussian distribution
(b) Poisson distribution, λ = 2
(c) Multinomial distribution
(d) A complex 2d distribution
Fig. 1: Similarity between inverse kNN distance 1/gk(x) and likelihood f(x)
for k = 1.
Specifically, in the training phase, to estimate Ωα
ODIT ranks the points in XN1 in the ascending order
{x(1), . . . ,x(N1)} in terms of the total distance
Lm =
k∑
n=k−s+1
gn(xm)
γ , (6)
where gn(xm) is the Euclidean distance between point xm ∈
XN1 and its nth nearest neighbor in XN2 , s ∈ [1, k] is a fixed
number introduced for convenience, and γ > 0 is the weight.
5Fig. 2: Overview of the ODIT anomaly detection mechanism.
Next, it picks the first K points XKN1 = {x(1), . . . ,x(K)} ⊂XN1 with the smallest total distances {L(1), . . . , L(K)} to
estimate the MVS Ωα, i.e., Ωˆα = XKN1 . It is known [16] thatXKN1 converges to Ωα as
lim
K,N1→∞
K/N1 → 1− α.
Hence, K is chosen as K = bN1(1 − α)c, where b·c is the
floor operator.
In the test phase, for each data instance xt, ODIT firstly
computes the total distance Lt with respect to the second
training set XN2 as in (6). Then, it computes the anomaly
evidence, which could be either positive or negative, by
comparing Lt with the MVS model found in the training phase
through the borderline total distance L(K)
Dt = d(logLt − logL(K)), (7)
where d is the number of data dimensions. Finally, it updates a
detection statistic ∆t which accumulates the anomaly evidence
Dt over time, and raises an anomaly alarm the first time ∆t
crosses a predefined threshold,
∆t = max{∆t−1 +Dt, 0}, ∆0 = 0,
T = min{t : ∆t ≥ h},
(8)
which is a CUSUM-like procedure (cf. (4)). The ODIT pro-
cedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The proposed ODIT procedure
1: Input: XN , k, s, α, h
2: Initialize: ∆← 0, t← 1
3: Training phase:
4: Partition XN into two sets XN1 and XN2
5: For each xm ∈ XN1 compute Lm as in (6)
6: Find L(K) by selecting the Kth smallest Lm
7: Test phase:
8: while ∆ < h do
9: Get new data xt and compute Dt as in (7)
10: ∆ = max{∆ +Dt, 0}
11: t← t+ 1
12: Declare Anomaly
The computation of the anomaly evidence Dt for each
test instance xt has the simpler form Dt = Lt − L(K) in
[22], where we proposed ODIT the first time. Although this
simpler form of Dt and the form proposed in (7) have similar
structures, and they perform quite similarly in practice, the
new form given in (7) naturally appears while proving the
asymptotic optimality of ODIT in the minimax sense, as shown
next.
Theorem 1. When the nominal distribution f0(xt) is finite
and continuous, and the attack distribution f1(xt) is a uniform
distribution, as the training set grows, the ODIT statistic Dt
converges in probability to the log-likelihood ratio,
Dt
p→ log f1(xt)
f0(xt)
as N2 →∞, (9)
i.e., ODIT converges to CUSUM, which is minimax optimum
in minimizing expected detection delay while satisfying a false
alarm constraint.
Proof: Consider a hypersphere St ∈ Rd centered at xt
with radius gk(xt), the kNN distance of xt with respect
to the training set XN2 . The maximum likelihood estimate
for the probability of a point being inside St under f0 is
given by k/N2. It is known that, as the total number of
points grow, this binomial probability estimate converges to
the true probability mass in St in the mean square sense
[25], i.e., k/N2
L2→ ∫St f0(x) dx as N2 → ∞. Hence,
the probability density estimate fˆ0(xt) =
k/N2
Vdgk(xt)d
, where
Vdgk(xt)
d is the volume of St with the appropriate con-
stant Vd, converges to the actual probability density function,
fˆ0(xt)
p→ f0(xt) as N2 → ∞, since St shrinks and
gk(xt)→ 0. Similarly, considering a hypersphere S(K) ∈ Rd
around x(K) which includes k points with its radius gk(x(K)),
we see that as N2 → ∞, gk(x(K)) → 0 and fˆ0(x(K)) =
k/N2
Vdgk(x(K))d
p→ f0(x(K)). Assuming a uniform distribution
f1(x) = f0(x(K)), ∀x, we conclude with log
k/N2
Vdgk(x(K))
d
k/N2
Vdgk(xt)
d
=
d
[
log gk(xt)− log gk(x(K))
] p→ log f1(xt)f0(xt) as N2 → ∞,
where Lt = gk(xt) for s = γ = 1. For γ values different than
1, Dt converges to the log-likelihood ratio scaled by γ.
Note that ODIT does not train on any anomalous data, i.e.,
does not use any knowledge of anomaly to be detected. While
this generality is an attractive trait as it allows detection of any
statistical anomaly, it also inevitably limits the performance for
known anomaly types on which detectors can train. We will
extend ODIT to this case with available anomaly information
in Section III-C. In Theorem 1, we show that in the lack
of knowledge about anomalies, ODIT reasonably assumes an
uninformative uniform likelihood for the anomaly case, and
achieves asymptotic optimality under this assumption in the
CUSUM-sense for certain parameter choices.
Remark 1 (Parameter Selection): Due to its sequential
nature, the parameters of ODIT either directly or indirectly
control the fundamental trade-off between minimizing average
detection delay and false alarm rate. Parameters k and s
determine how many nearest neighbors to take into account
in computing the total distance Lm, given by (6). Smaller
k would result in being more sensitive to anomaly, hence
supports earlier detection, but at the same time it causes to
6be more prone to the false alarms due to nominal outliers.
Larger k would result in vice versa. s is an auxiliary parameter
chosen for further flexibility in this trade-off. s = 1 considers
only the kth nearest neighbor while s = k sums all the first k
nearest neighbors. Similar to k, smaller s makes the algorithm
more sensitive to anomaly, but also more prone to nominal
outliers. However, the effect of s is secondary to that of k. k
and s should be chosen together to strike a balance between
sensitivity to anomalies and robustness to nominal outliers.
0 < γ < d is the weight which determines the emphasis
on the difference between distances. Large distance values
are emphasized by large γ values and suppressed by small γ
values. The alarm threshold h in (8) directly controls the trade-
off between minimizing detection delay and false alarm rate.
Decreasing h will yield smaller detection delays, i.e., earlier
detection, but also more frequent false alarms. It is typically
selected to satisfy a false alarm constraint. The significance
level α is at a secondary role supporting h. For fixed h, larger
α would result in a smaller estimated MVS Ωˆα, which in
turn results in smaller detection delays, but also more frequent
false alarms since more nominal data points will lie outside
the selected MVS. Note that h is the final decision threshold,
whereas α is more of an intermediate parameter. Hence, one
can always set α to a reasonable significance value, such as
0.05, and then adjust h accordingly to satisfy a desired false
alarm rate. Regarding the sizes of training sets N2 plays a more
important role than N1, as shown in Theorem 1. Specifically,
N2 determines the accuracy of likelihood estimates by the
kNN distances, whereas N1 determines how well the signifi-
cance level α is satisfied, which is an intermediate parameter
as discussed before. Hence, typically N2 should be chosen
larger than N1, where N1 +N2 = N . It should be noted that
the ODIT procedure, given by Algorithm 1, can also work
without partitioning the training set. Partitioning is proposed
for computational efficiency when dealing with large high-
dimensional datasets. However, it does not decrease the order
of magnitude in computational complexity (see Section III-B)
since even without partitioning the online testing procedure al-
ready scales linearly with the number of training instances, as
opposed to the bipartite GEM algorithm [16] which decreases
the complexity to linear from exponential using partitioning.
As a result, Algorithm 1 can be used without partitioning the
training set, especially for small datasets.
Remark 2 (Graph Interpretation): The K points in MVS
estimate XKN1 and their k nearest neighbors in XN2 form
an Euclidean kNN graph G = (XKN1 , E), where X
K
N1 is the
set of vertices and E is the set of edges connecting XKN1 to
the neighbors in XN2 . The constructed graph G minimizes
the total edge length
∑K
m=1 Lm among all possible K-point
kNN graphs between XN1 and XN2 . The computation of
anomaly evidence Dt in (7) can then be interpreted as the
increase/decrease in the log of total edge length if the K-kNN
graph were to include the test point xt.
Remark 3 (Comparisons): ODIT learns Ωˆα using kNN
distances similarly to the outlier detection method called
Geometric Entropy Minimization (GEM) [15], [16]. However,
in the test phase, unlike GEM, which declares anomaly even
when a single test point falls outside the MVS, ODIT sequen-
tially updates a test statistic ∆t using the closeness/remoteness
of the test point to the MVS, and declares anomaly only when
∆t is large enough, i.e., there is enough anomaly evidence with
respect to a false alarm constraint. Doing so ODIT is able to
timely and accurately detect persistent anomalies, as shown
theoretically in Theorem 1 and through numerical results
in Section III-E and Section V. Whereas, one-shot outlier
detectors like GEM are prone to high false alarm rates due to
the limitation of significance tests [26], [27]. The sequential
detection structure of ODIT resembles that of CUSUM albeit
with fundamental differences. Actually, the test statistic of
ODIT implements a discrepancy function motivated by the
discrepancy theory [28] and discrepancy norm [29], hence
the name Online Discrepancy Test (ODIT). The nonparametric
nature of ODIT does not require any knowledge of the nominal
and anomaly probability distributions, as opposed to CUSUM.
Moreover, the practical relaxations of CUSUM, such as G-
CUSUM and independent CUSUM [13], cannot be applied
to challenging scenarios such as high-dimensional systems
which require multivariate anomaly detection with little or no
knowledge of anomaly types. On the other hand, ODIT scales
well to high-dimensional systems for multivariate detection,
as discussed next.
B. Computational Complexity
Next, we analyze the computational complexity of our
proposed method. Training phase of ODIT requires the kNN
distances between each pair of the data points in the two
training sets. Therefore, the time complexity of training phase
is O(N1N2d), where d is the data dimensionality. The space
complexity of training is O(N2d) since N2 points are stored
for testing. Note that training is performed once offline, thus
the complexity of online testing is usually critical for scala-
bility. In the test phase, computing the kNN distance of a test
point among all points in the second training set takes O(N2d)
time. The space complexity of testing is not significant as the
test statistic is updated recursively. Consequently, the proposed
ODIT algorithm linearly scales with the data dimensionality
d both in training and testing. In the online testing phase,
it also scales linearly with the number of training points. For
high-dimensional systems with abundance of training data, the
online testing time could be the bottleneck in implementing
ODIT.
kNN Approximation: Computing the nearest neighbors of a
query point is the most computationally expensive part of the
algorithm as the distance to every other point in the second
training data needs to be computed to select the k smallest
ones. As the dimensionality increases and the training size
grows, the algorithm becomes less efficient in terms of the
running time. To this end, we propose to approximate the kNN
distance rather than computing its exact value. It is natural to
expect that ODIT’s performance will drop due to the inaccu-
racy induced by the approximated kNN distances compared to
that based on the exact kNN distances. However, depending
on the system specifications, e.g., how frequently the data
arrives and how critical timely detection is, the reduction in
7Fig. 3: ODIT statistics based on exact and approximate kNN distances when
Tsampling = 1 sec. (top) and Tsampling = 0.01 sec. (bottom).
running time through kNN approximation may compensate
for the performance loss, as we next analyze through an
experiment. [30] proposes a kNN distance approximation
algorithm that scales well to high-dimensional data. This
algorithm performs hierarchical clustering by constructing a k-
means tree, and approximates the kNN distance by performing
a priority search in the k-means tree, i.e., by searching for
the k nearest neighbors only among a limited number of
data points. The computation complexity of constructing the
tree is O(N2dCImax logN2logC ), where Imax is the maximum
number of iterations in k-means clustering, C is the number
of clusters (a.k.a. branching factor), and logN2logC is the average
height of the tree. Using the priority search k-means tree algo-
rithm, the computational complexity of kNN search reduces
to O(Bd logN2logC ), where B  N2 is the maximum number
of data points to examine. Hence, the training complexity
reduces to O((N1B + N2CImax) logN2logC d) from O(N1N2d).
Note that B  N2 and the number of iterations required
for convergence is small [30]. More importantly, in online
testing, the computational complexity per instance decreases
to O(B logN2logC d) from O(N2d).
Experiment: We experimented with this approximation in
our algorithm. The experiment is done in Matlab on an Intel
3.60 GHz processor with 16 GB RAM. In the experiment,
the dimensionality of data is d = 50, the training data size
is N = 5 × 105, partitioned into N1 = 0.38N and N2 =
0.62N 1, and the anomaly is defined as a shift in the mean
of Gaussian observations by 3 standard deviation in 10% of
the dimensions. We set the branching factor for building the
priority search k-means tree as C = 100, and the maximum
number of points to examine during search for the k nearest
neighbors as B = 1000. The average computation time for
both ODITs based on the exact and the approximate kNN
distance is summarized in the Table I, which presents the time
spent for the computation of (7) and (8) per observation. It is
seen that the approximation method drops the average running
time per observation to about 1/14 of that of the exact method.
To compare the original and efficient ODITs in systems
1The same partitioning ratio is used in the experiments throughout the
paper.
TABLE I: Average computation overhead of original ODIT and efficient ODIT
per sample
Average execution time (sec.)
Exact kNN Approximate kNN
0.0750 0.0054
Fig. 4: Comparison between performance of ODIT based on exact and
approximate kNN distances in terms of seconds for Tsampling = 1 sec. (top)
and Tsampling = 0.01 sec. (bottom).
with different specifications, in terms of the frequency of data
arrival, we considered the following two scenarios: (i) data
arrives every 1 sec., and (ii) data arrives every 0.01 sec.
Figs. 3 and 4 compare the decision statistics and average
performance of ODIT based on exact and approximate kNN
in the two scenarios. Considering the extra samples needed
for detection after the attack onset, as well as the computation
time overhead for the last sample before detection, the actual
detection delay in time unit is given by sample delay ×
sampling period + computational overhead. Depending
on the sampling period, either exact kNN or approximate
kNN could be more advantageous. For a sampling period
that is smaller than the computation overhead, exact kNN
computations are usually not feasible, causing the original
ODIT to miss multiple samples while performing the test for
a data instance, as can be seen in the staircase statistic in solid
blue in the bottom figure of Fig. 3. Therefore, in such a case,
approximate kNN computations are preferred over the exact
kNN computations in terms of the actual detection delay (see
the bottom figure in Fig. 4). Whereas for a sufficiently large
sampling period, the delay is mainly due to the extra samples,
thus exact kNN computations yield better results this case, as
shown in the top figure in Fig. 4.
Summary of ODIT: Here we highlight the prominent fea-
tures of the proposed ODIT anomaly detector:
• The sequential nature of ODIT makes it suitable for real-
time systems, and especially for systems in which quick
and accurate detection is critical. Additionally, as the
nominal training set grows, it asymptotically achieves
the minimax optimality in terms of quick and accurate
detection when anomaly is from uniform distribution.
• It is capable of performing multivariate detection in
high-dimensional systems, as illustrated in Section III-E,
thanks to its nonparametric and scalable nature.
• ODIT can detect unknown anomaly types since it does not
8depend on any assumption about anomalies. Moreover,
it is suitable for online learning such that its detection
performance can be improved over time for previously
encountered anomaly types (see Section III-D).
C. An Extension: ODIT-2
In this section we consider the case of having an additional
anomaly training dataset along with the previously discussed
nominal dataset. Next, we extend the ODIT method to take
advantage of the anomaly dataset in order to improve its
performance. With the inclusion of an anomaly training set,
the ODIT-2 procedure is akin to the classification methods
based on kNN distance [31], [32]. However, these meth-
ods are not sequential. Consider an anomaly training set
X ′M = {x′1,x′2, ...,x′M} in addition to the nominal set
XN = {x1,x2, ...,xN}. In this case, the anomaly evidence for
each instance can be computed by comparing the total distance
Lt with respect to the nominal dataset with the total distance
L′t with respect to the anomalous dataset. Thus, there is no
need to learn the borderline total distance L(K) in training to
be used as a baseline for Lt in testing (cf. 7). That is, no
training is needed for ODIT-2. However, before testing, a pre-
processing might be required to remove the data points that
are similar to the nominal train set. The reason for cleaning
the anomaly dataset rather than the nominal dataset is that
usually anomaly dataset is obtained by collecting observations
from a known anomalous event which may typically include
nominal observations too. For instance, in a network intrusion
detection system (IDS), after occurrence of an attack, several
observations could still be of nominal nature. The cleaning step
is done by finding and removing the data points of anomaly
training set which lie in the estimated MVS of the nominal
training set,
X cleanM = X ′M \ {x′m ∈ X ′M : Lx′m ≤ L(K)}, (10)
where Lx′m is the total distance of x
′
m with respect to the
nominal points in XN2 . Hence, the training procedure of
ODIT, which finds L(K), can be used for preprocessing the
anomalous train data.
While testing for each test data instance xt, the anomaly
evidence is calculated by
Dt = d(logLt − logL′t) + log(N/M), (11)
where Lt and L′t are the total distances of xt computed using
(6) with respect to the points in XN2 and X cleanM2 , respectively;
and N and M are the number of points in the nominal and
(cleaned) anomalous training sets. The statistic update and
decision rule of ODIT-2 are the same as in ODIT, given by
(8). In the ODIT-2 procedure, different than Algorithm 1, (11)
is used in line 9 to compute the anomaly evidence Dt.
In practice, there is a typical imbalance between the sizes
of nominal and anomaly training sets due to the inherent
difficulty of obtaining anomaly samples. Since the total kNN
distances in a dense nominal set XN are expected to be smaller
than those in a sparse anomaly dataset, for an anomalous
data point, Lt can be smaller than L′t, resulting in a negative
anomaly evidence, which can lead to poor detection. In order
to deal with the imbalance of datasets, the term log(N/M) in
(11) acts as a correction factor. Specifically, for N > M ,
log(N/M) > 0 compensates for Lt being unfairly small
compared to L′t. This correction factor naturally appears in
the asymptotic optimality proof, as shown next.
Corollary 1. When the nominal distribution f0(xt) and
anomalous distribution f1(xt) are finite and continuous, as
the training sets grow, the ODIT-2 statistic Dt, given by (11),
converges in probability to the log-likelihood ratio,
Dt
p→ log f1(xt)
f0(xt)
as M,N →∞, (12)
i.e., ODIT-2 converges to CUSUM, which is minimax optimum
in minimizing expected detection delay while satisfying a false
alarm constraint.
Proof: From the proof of Theorem 1, we know that
k/N
Vdgk(xt)d
p→ f0(xt) as N →∞. Similarly, we can show that
k/M
Vdg′k(xt)
d
p→ f1(xt) as M → ∞, where g′k(xt) is the kNN
distance of xt in the anomalous training set X ′M . Hence, we
conclude with log
k/M
Vdg
′
k
(xt)
d
k/N
Vdgk(xt)
d
= d [log gk(xt)− log g′k(xt)] +
log(N/M)
p→ log f1(xt)f0(xt) as M,N →∞, where Lt = gk(xt)
and L′t = g
′
k(xt) for s = γ = 1.
D. Unified Framework for Online Learning
Availability of labeled training data is a major limiting
factor for improving the performance of anomaly detection
techniques. In several applications, obtaining a comprehen-
sive and accurate labeled training dataset for the anomaly
class is very difficult [1]. In contrast, in most applications
typically sufficient amount of comprehensive nominal training
data is available. Semi-supervised techniques including ODIT,
constitute a popular class of anomaly detection methods that
require labeled training data only for the nominal class. These
techniques try to build a model of nominal operation/behavior.
Hence, anomaly detection is performed by detecting data
which significantly deviates from the constructed nominal
model. Supervised techniques on the other hand, assume
availability of both nominal and anomalous datasets, and build
models for classifying unseen data into nominal vs. anomaly
classes. ODIT-2, as an example supervised technique, out-
performs the semi-supervised ODIT technique for the known
anomaly types, as shown in Section III-E and Section V. How-
ever, ODIT-2, and in general supervised anomaly detectors, fall
short of detecting unknown anomaly types while ODIT, and in
general semi-supervised anomaly detectors, can easily handle
new anomaly patterns as they do not depend on assumptions
about the anomalies.
Combining the strengths of ODIT and ODIT-2, we propose
an online learning scheme called ODIT-uni which is capable
of detecting new anomaly types and and at the same time
improving its performance for detecting the previously seen
anomaly types. Particularly, in the unified ODIT method, both
ODIT and ODIT-2 run in parallel to detect anomalies, and the
anomalous data instances first detected by ODIT are included
in the anomalous training set of ODIT-2 in order to empower
9the detection of similar anomaly types. Since the ODIT-2
procedure involves all the necessary elements for ODIT, there
is no further computation overhead induced by the unified
approach. Keeping track of the cumulative decision statistics
of ODIT and ODIT-2 the unified ODIT scheme, ODIT-uni,
stops the first time either ODIT or ODIT-2 stops:
∆
(1)
t = max{∆(1)t +D(1)t , 0}, ∆(2)t = max{∆(2)t +D(2)t , 0}
T = min{t : ∆(1)t ≥ h1 or ∆(2)t ≥ h2}, (13)
where D(1)t and D
(2)
t are the anomaly evidences given by
(7) and (11), respectively, and h1 and h2 are the decision
thresholds for ODIT and ODIT-2. For known anomaly patterns
on which ODIT-2 is trained, it is expected that ∆(2)t ≥ h2
happens earlier, whereas ∆(1)t ≥ h1 is supposed to detect
new anomaly types. If the alarm is raised by ODIT, then the
anomaly onset time is estimated as the last time instance the
ODIT statistic was zero, i.e., τˆ = max{t < T : ∆(1)t = 0},
and the data instances {xτˆ+1, . . . ,xT } between τˆ and T are
added to the ODIT-2 anomaly training set. For reliable en-
hancement of the ODIT-2 anomaly training set with the newly
detected instances, the ODIT threshold h1 needs to be selected
sufficiently high to prevent false alarms by ODIT, and thus
false inclusions into the ODIT-2 training set. Obviously, large
h1 will increase the detection delays for previously unseen
anomaly types, however, avoiding false training instances is a
more crucial objective.
E. Example: Detecting Change in the Covariance of a High-
Dimensional System
The nonparametric nature of the proposed ODIT detec-
tors makes them suitable for multivariate detection in high-
dimensional and heterogeneous systems. Through an experi-
ment we next show the advantage of ODIT and ODIT-2 over
the parametric G-CUSUM detector in a challenging setting
where anomaly is manifested as a change in the correlation
between the individual data streams. This type of anomaly is
well exemplified by the MadIoT attacks, recently introduced in
[7], in which high wattage IoT devices, such as air conditioners
and water heaters, are synchronously turned on/off to cause
instability, and as a result blackout in the power grid.
Since it is not tractable to estimate the joint distribution of
high-dimensional observations, especially the set of anoma-
lous dimensions in the anomaly case, we implement the G-
CUSUM detector proposed in [13] which performs univariate
analysis by assuming that the data streams are independent. As
expected this univariate approach fails to detect the change in
the covariance of observations. In the experiment, we simulate
a 100-dimensional system that generates data following a
multivariate Gaussian distribution with µ = 20 and σ = 10 for
the individual data streams, which initially have no correlation.
At time t = 100, the covariance matrix of the observations is
changed by randomly adding ρ = 0.6 correlation between
50% of the data streams without any change in the mean
and variance (i.e., diagonal terms in the covariance matrix).
Fig. 5 demonstrates the change in the distribution of two data
dimensions. For better visualization, some of the anomaly
Fig. 5: Change in the correlation.
instances that overlap with the nominal instances are not
shown. We used N = 2× 104 nominal training instances, and
M = 2× 104 anomalous training instances, which decreased
to M = 4836 after cleaning, for a scenario in which 50% of
the data dimensions become correlated with ρ = 0.6.
In the experiment we compare the performance of ODIT al-
gorithms with G-CUSUM and Oracle CUSUM, which exactly
knows the nominal and anomalous probability distributions.
This is a challenging problem due to the fact that the mean
and variance of individual data-streams does not change. In
particular, some data instances after the anomaly onset are
still very similar to the nominal instances. To cope with the
similarity of the anomaly instances to the nominal ones, the
parameters of ODIT algorithms are set to be k = s = γ = 1,
α1 = 0.2, α2 = 0.005, and the cleaning step is performed
on the anomaly train set for ODIT-2. As depicted by its
ever-increasing decision statistic in Fig. 6, G-CUSUM fails to
detect anomalies since it is not able to monitor correlations.
Whereas, the ODIT algorithms successfully detect the change
in the covariance structure of observations by performing
multivariate analysis, as shown in Fig. 7. Since ODIT does not
use any anomaly data in training, it detects the anomaly with
larger delays compared to ODIT-2. This example provides a
scenario where the availability of a set of previously encoun-
tered anomalous instances greatly helps ODIT-2 to perform
significantly better. ODIT-2 achieves a close performance to
the impractical Oracle CUSUM algorithm in the ideal case in
which the anomalous dimensions in the test matches the ones
in the training. To demonstrate that ODIT-2 is still able to
operate reasonably well under non-ideal conditions, we tested
it for the case where there is a mismatch between the test and
train data in terms of the set of data-streams getting correlated.
In this case, 27 out of the 50 dimensions getting correlated are
not seen in the anomaly train data. Fig. 7 shows that despite
the mismatch, ODIT-2 still performs better than ODIT.
IV. ANOMALY LOCALIZATION USING ODIT
In this section, we propose a localization strategy to identify
the data dimensions in which the detected anomaly occurs so
that necessary steps can be taken to mitigate the anomaly.
Specifically, after an anomaly is detected in ODIT, our ob-
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Fig. 6: Decision statistics of ODITs vs. G-CUSUM and Oracle CUSUM in
the correlation monitoring example.
Fig. 7: Performance comparison for ODITs in the correlation monitoring
example.
jective is to identify the dimensions that caused the detection
statistic ∆t to increase considerably and ultimately resulted
in the detection. Our approach to perform this task is by
examining the contribution of each dimension individually
to the decision statistics. In the case of detection by ODIT,
an increase in the total distance Lt, given by (6), leads
to an increase in the anomaly evidence Dt, given by (7),
finally leading to an increase in the detection statistic ∆t,
given by (8), and consequently the anomaly alarm. Let us
assume xt is the test data instance, and {y1, . . . ,yk} are its
k nearest neighbors in the train set. The total kNN distance
Lt =
∑k
n=k−s+1 ‖xt − yn‖γ , for γ = 2, can be written in
terms of the d data dimensions as
Lt =
d∑
i=1
δit, where δ
i
t =
k∑
n=k−s+1
(xit − yin)2, (14)
and xit and y
i
n are the ith dimensions of the observation xt
and its nth nearest neighbor yn. δ
i
t is the contribution of ith
dimension of the observation xt at time t to the detection
statistic. Therefore, by analyzing δit for each dimension i
during the final increase period of ∆t, which causes the
anomaly alarm, we can identify the dimensions in which
anomaly has been observed. To this end, we propose to use
a recent history of Qi = {δiq : q = τˆ + 1, . . . , τˆ + S, ∀i}
since the last time ∆q = 0. This time τˆ , the most recent time
instance when the detection statistic was zero, can be seen as
an estimate of the anomaly onset time. Finally, we apply a t-
test on the S samples in Q to decide whether each dimension
i is anomalous.
In particular, we propose the following anomaly localization
procedure after the alarm is raised at time T :
1) Find τˆ = max{t < T : ∆t = 0}
2) Compute the sample mean and sample standard deviation
of Qi for each dimension i:
δi =
1
S
τˆ+S∑
t=τˆ+1
δit and ηi =
√√√√ 1
S − 1
τˆ+S∑
t=τˆ+1
(δit − δi)2
(15)
3) Identify the anomalous dimensions by applying a t-test:
if
δi − µi
ηi/
√
S
≥ θ, then dimension i is anomalous, (16)
where µi is the sample mean of nominal training
{δi1, . . . , δiN1} values, and θ is the (1 − β)th percentile,
for significance level β, of Student’s t-distribution with
S − 1 degrees of freedom.
The significance level β, for which a typical value is 0.05, con-
trols a balance between sensitivity to anomalies and robustness
to nominal outliers. For given β and S values, the threshold
θ can be easily found from a lookup table for Student’s t-
distribution (e.g., θ = 6.314 for β = 0.05 and S = 2). The
number of samples S needs to be at least 2 to have a degree
of freedom at least 1. In practice, t-test is commonly used
for small sample sizes, therefore S does not need to be large.
Indeed, larger S would cause longer reaction time since the
localization analysis would be performed at time τˆ+S, which
could be greater than the detection time T , incurring extra
delay for localization and reaction after detection.
Localization by ODIT-2 is slightly different. Since
logL(KN ) and logL
′
(KM )
are constant, the increase that causes
the alarm takes place in logLt − logL′t. Writing Lt and L′t
in terms of the contributions from the d dimensions, δit and
δ
′i
t , respectively, as in (14), the increase in the difference
(δit − δ
′i
t ) for some i leads to the increase in the decision
statistics. Similar to ODIT, firstly τˆ is found after a detection.
Then, in the second step, the δ
i
and ηi are computed by
replacing δit with (δ
i
t − δ
′i
t ) in (15). Finally, in the third
step, µi corresponds to the sample mean of nominal training
{(δi1 − δ
′i
1 ), . . . , (δ
i
N1
− δ′iN1)} values.
V. DDOS ATTACK MITIGATION
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is a major
security problem in today’s widely-networked systems and
requires effective solution approaches [33], [34]. DDoS attack
is traditionally known as a type of cyber-attack targeting an
Internet service, with the intention of making it unavailable for
the legitimate users. Nevertheless, it has also been recently
investigated in the cyber-physical systems domain, such as
the smart grid [7]. DDoS attack is typically performed by
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overwhelming the target with malicious requests from multiple
geographically distributed sources. The attacker first builds a
network of malicious devices known as “botnet” by infecting
them with malware, and then remotely controls these devices
to synchronously send some form of service requests to the
target, which initiates a DDoS attack. The size of botnet
both in the number of compromised devices and geographical
distribution determines the threat level of a DDoS attack. It is
extremely difficult to successfully mitigate a large-scale DDoS
attack centrally at the attacked site without disrupting the
regular service to legitimate users, as recently demonstrated
by the massive DDoS attacks empowered by Internet-of-things
(IoT) devices [34].
Low-Rate DDoS: The proliferation of IoT devices exacer-
bates the DDoS attack problem as many IoT devices, such as
Internet-connected sensors, have low security measures, mak-
ing them vulnerable to malware infections [35]. Abundance
of low-security IoT devices worldwide enables an even more
challenging new type of DDoS attack, called low-rate DDoS
[2], which is considered a stealth attack since the amount of
anomalous service requests from each compromised device
can be quite low. Such low-rate change in the device behavior
can easily bypass local intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that
rely on observing raw data, such as data filters and firewalls.
Yet, a synchronous low-rate DDoS attack from huge number
of compromised devices, e.g., millions of IoT devices, can
easily cause an overwhelming aggregated service request, and
thus the failure of target. Successful DDoS attack mitigation
requires quick detection of attack, and accurate identification
of sources of malicious requests so that appropriate counter-
measures can be taken against the attack. The timely detection
of low-rate DDoS attacks is quite challenging at the local level,
e.g., at the routers close to IoT devices. Although detection is
trivial at the target due to the overwhelming aggregated service
requests, accurate identification of attacking nodes and as a
result mitigation of the DDoS attack in a centralized fashion
is not tractable.
Challenges: There are several challenges for mitigating low-
rate DDoS attacks. (i) High-dimensionality: DDoS attacks in-
herently relate to large-scale systems. Therefore, the proposed
methods need to scale well to large systems. Particularly, for
low-rate DDoS attacks, timely and accurate detection at a local
level is challenging due to the similarity of attack behavior
to the nominal behavior. Multivariate anomaly detection tech-
niques can greatly facilitate timely and accurate detection,
however even in a local IoT network, dimensionality, i.e.,
number of devices, makes joint probability density estimation
intractable for parametric methods. (ii) Heterogeneity: The
heterogeneous nature of IoT results in complex probability
distributions even under nominal settings. Each device type in
the network has different usage characteristics. For instance, it
is expected for computer, phone, smart watch and temperature
sensor in a network to have different operational baselines.
Furthermore, even the nominal probability distribution of a
single device is usually complicated due to its different opera-
tion modes, such as active use, passive use at the background,
and hibernation. (iii) Unknown attack types: Due to the myriad
of vulnerabilities in a network of low-security IoT devices, it is
not possible to know future attack patterns. The conventional
signature-based IDSs are not effective since they can only
detect a predefined set of attack patterns. For the same reason,
parametric detection techniques which assume probabilistic
models for anomalies are not feasible as well. To be able
to detect unknown anomaly types, a nonparametric detection
method is needed.
Application of ODIT: Considering the challenges mentioned
above ODIT provides an effective local DDoS attack miti-
gation approach that can handle high-dimensionality, hetero-
geneity, and unknown attack types for quick and accurate
detection. Utilizing the hierarchical structure of large-scale
systems, such as the Internet and the power distribution
network, multiple ODITs running at local level, such as routers
and data aggregators, can provide a complete IDS for DDoS
attack mitigation. Since ODIT is a generic anomaly detection
method, we do not specify the observed data type, i.e., service
request, in the following simulations for DDoS mitigation.
For instance, following the commonly used DDoS concept
in computer networks (e.g., flooding-based DDoS [33]) the
observed data vector could be the number of packets in unit
time, such as packets per second, from a number of devices in
the network 2; or considering a power delivery network like in
[7] the observed data dimensions could be the power demand
from houses.
A. Compared Methods
We compare the performance of the proposed methods
with two state-of-the-art detection methods for DDoS at-
tacks. The information metric-based method [2], and the
deep autoencoder method [35] are used for comparison in
the simulation (Section V-B) and real dataset (Section V-C)
experiments, respectively. The latter was proposed in the paper
that presented the N-BaIoT dataset [35], thus we use it to
evaluate the performance of the proposed ODIT detectors on
this dataset in Section V-C. The former is a window-based
method that assumes Gaussian distribution for the nominal
data, and Poisson distribution for the attack data. Specifically,
in the training phase, it fits a Gaussian distribution to a nominal
dataset, and then in the test phase it fits a Poisson distribution
to a window of samples. By sliding the window and updating
the Poisson distribution at each time it computes its detection
statistic as
Dα(P,Q) = Dα(P ||Q) +Dα(Q||P ) (17)
where P and Q are the estimated Gaussian and Poisson
distributions, and Dα(P ||Q) is the Re´nyi divergence between
P and Q with parameter α ∈ (0,∞). Since this method
is a window-based, its performance is highly dependent on
the choice of the window size. For small window size, the
accuracy of the probability distributions would not be good,
resulting in poor performance, while large window size would
increase the detection delay, as the attacks can only be detected
at the end of the initial window. In the worst scenario assuming
that the window size is W and anomaly starts at the beginning
2The real-time demonstration of ODIT using an IoT testbed can be seen at
https://youtu.be/zQexZgB5AMs.
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of the window, the detection delay would be at least W .
Moreover, for large window size, it would take more time to
see the effect of attack in the estimated Poisson distribution,
and thus longer detection delays. This method is designed to
capture the increase in the average data rate with respect to the
average in the training dataset. We also compare the proposed
methods with the conventional data filtering method that filters
out the service requests, in particular data packets, from nodes
whose number in a certain period (e.g., packet rate) exceeds
a predefined threshold.
B. Experiment on Simulated Data
In the first experiment, as part of a low-rate DDoS attack
scenario, we simulated an IoT network with d = 50 devices
of different types, each having different nominal data trans-
mission rates. Although the N-BaIoT dataset used in Section
V-C is also collected from a similar IoT network, the attack
magnitudes (i.e., increase in the data rates) are significantly
higher than what we consider as low-rate DDoS here. We
perform this simulation study to investigate a low-rate DDoS
attack scenario in larger IoT networks. For example, the
nominal data rate of a temperature sensor is considerably
lower than that of a surveillance camera or a computer. In
this simulation setup, 30% of the devices have two modes
of operation, active and inactive states, with higher data rates
in the former. The rest of the devices have a single baseline
representing the background traffic in practical networks. The
data rates of each device are generated independently from
each other from a Gaussian distribution. For a device, data
rates over time are independent and identically distributed. The
mean data rates are chosen randomly in [10, 50] for inactive
states, in [50, 90] for active states, and in [10, 100] for the
devices with single states. The same variance σ2 = 5 is used
for all devices. Note that data rates of the bimodal devices with
active and inactive states follow a mixture of two Gaussian
distributions. The frequency of active and inactive states are set
to be equal. Assume that an attacker initiates a DDoS attack at
time τ = 101 through several compromised devices present in
the network. When an attack starts, the compromised devices
start sending data at a higher rate with a 5 standard deviation
increase.
In the ODIT algorithms, we set the parameters as k = 1,
s = 1, α1 = 0.05, α2 = 0.05, γ = 1, S = 2. The results are
obtained using N = 2× 105 nominal instances and M = 105
anomalous instances. Fig. 8 shows the decision statistics of
ODIT, ODIT-2 and the information metric-based algorithm
proposed in [2]. As depicted in the figure, ODIT statistics
exhibit an abrupt increase. The best window size for the
information metric-based method is found to be W = 5. The
information distance starts increasing only when the window
contains enough number of anomalous data instances. This
result is consistent with the average performance results (av-
erage detection delay vs. false alarm rate) shown in Fig. 9. The
ODIT-2 detector achieves zero detection delay with no false
alarm. Similarly, ODIT achieves very small average detection
delay while satisfying very low false alarm rate at 10−3.
Although the information metric-based method also achieves
Fig. 8: Decision statistics of ODIT, ODIT-2 and the information metric-based
method in the DDoS simulation study.
Fig. 9: Average detection performance of the proposed ODIT, ODIT-2 and
information metric-based detectors in the DDoS simulation study.
reasonable detection delays, compared to ODITs it suffers
from its window-based nature. The smaller or larger window
sizes do not give better results due to insufficient accuracy
in probability distribution estimations and less sensitivity to
anomalies, respectively.
The receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves for lo-
calization of the malicious devices are shown in Fig. 10. In
comparison with the data filtering approach, ODIT and ODIT-
2 successfully identify the malicious devices with probability
0.95 and 1, respectively, while satisfying the false positive rate
of 0.05. The conventional data filtering approach identifies
a device as anomalous if its data rate exceeds a predefined
threshold. Due to the small attack magnitudes in the simulated
low-rate DDoS attack the data filtering approach fails to
achieve high identification probability while satisfying small
false positive rates.
C. Experiment on a Real Dataset: N-BaIoT
In the second experiment, we evaluated the proposed ODIT
algorithms using the N-BaIoT dataset, which consists of real
IoT data traffic observations including botnet attacks. This data
is collected from 9 IoT devices including doorbell, thermostat,
13
Fig. 10: ROC curve for identifying malicious devices in DDoS simulations.
baby monitor, etc. infected by the Mirai and BASHLITE
malware [35], [36]. Here we only consider the Mirai attack
dataset. The benign and attack datasets for each device is
composed of 115 features summarizing traffic statistics over
different temporal windows. The dataset is collected for each
device separately, and lacks timestamp. The number of in-
stances is varied for each device and attack type. Therefore,
we formed the training and test sets by randomly choosing data
instances from each device. To form a network-wide instance
for multivariate detection we stack the chosen instances from
9 devices into a single vector of 1035 dimensions. This way,
we obtain a nominal training set with N = 10, 000 instances.
We also build an anomalous training set with M = 5, 000
instances for the Ecobee thermostat device (device 3). To test
for both known and unknown attack types we let ODIT-2
train only on attack data from device 3, and test under two
scenarios: (i) device 3 (Ecobee Thermostat) is compromised
(known anomaly type) (ii) device 6 (Provision PT-838 security
camera) is compromised (unknown anomaly type). We form
the test data similarly to the training data, assuming that
the respective device gets compromised and starts sending
malicious traffic at t = 101. In the ODIT algorithms we set
parameters as k = s = γ = 1, α1 = 0.05, α2 = 0.1, S = 2.
An example of the decision statistics for ODIT and ODIT-2
under the two scenarios are shown in Fig. 11. ODIT is able
to detect the attack with zero detection delay and zero false
alarm in all trials in both known and unknown attack scenarios
(Fig. 12). As for ODIT-2, which trains also on attack data
from device 3, in the known attack scenario, zero detection
delay with zero false alarm in all trials is achieved, similar to
ODIT. Fig. 11 shows that the ODIT-2 decision statistic steadily
rise even for the unknown attack when device 6 is attacking,
yet with a smaller slope than that of ODIT, as expeected.
However, such a rise is not guaranteed to happen in general for
unknown anomaly types. When an unknown anomaly occurs
in the test observations, depending on whether the anomalous
observations are relatively similar to the nominal dataset or
to the anomalous dataset, ODIT-2 may or may not detect
the anomaly. In the case where the anomalous data instances
are relatively more similar to the nominal set than to the
anomaly set, ODIT-2 statistics will remain zero and it will
Fig. 11: Desision statistics of ODIT and ODIT-2 in both known and unknown
attack scenarios for the N-BaIoT dataset.
fail in detecting the anomaly. In the experiment, however,
the unknown anomaly type, the attack data from device 6, is
relatively more similar to the anomaly training set, the attack
data from device 3. Therefore, ODIT-2 is able to detect it, as
shown in Fig. 12, where the average detection performances
of ODIT and ODIT-2 are given for scenario 2 (unknown
anomaly).
Next, the identification of malicious device is investigated
in Fig. 13 in terms of the ROC curve (true positive rate
vs. false positive rate) under the known anomaly scenario.
Both variations of our proposed method identify the malicious
device with very high probability while achieving small false
alarm rates such as 0.01. We calculate the contribution of
each device to the decision statistic in (15) as the sum of
the contributions of all 115 dimensions corresponding to the
device.
We also compare the performance of ODIT to the deep
autoencoder-based detection method [35], as they both train
only on the nominal data. The autoencoder method marks each
observation instance as nominal or anomalous, and employs
majority voting on a moving window of size ws∗ (to control
the false positive rate), raising alarm only if the majority of the
instances within the window are marked as anomalous. Due
to its window-based majority rule, the sample detection delay
(i..e., the number of anomalous instances observed before the
detection) is at least bws∗2 c+1. Whereas, the sequential nature
of ODIT enables immediate detection together with zero false
alarm, as demonstrated in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15. Following the
analysis in [35] for each device, the sample detection delay
and the false positive rate of both methods are compared in
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15, respectively. The optimum window sizes
reported in [35] for each device are used for the autoencoder
method.
D. Online Learning Scheme: ODIT-uni
In this section, we present experiment results to demonstrate
the practical advantage of the unified framework ODIT-uni,
proposed in Section III-D. Following the simulated and real-
data experiments of Sections V-B and V-C we train the
algorithms on the nominal data and anomaly data for a specific
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Fig. 12: Performance comparison for ODIT and ODIT-2 in the unknown
attack scenario for the N-BaIoT dataset.
Fig. 13: ROC curve for anomaly localization using ODIT and ODIT-2 in the
known attack scenario for the N-BaIoT dataset.
attack type. For the N-BaIoT dataset, we repeat the scenario
2 test, in which device 6 (Provision PT-838 security camera)
starts sending malicious traffic while only attack data from
device 3 is used to train ODIT-2. We extend the simulation
experiment of Section V-B by testing the trained algorithms on
a new anomaly type. Specifically, at time t = 101 a different
set of devices start acting maliciously.
Fig. 16 shows, for both the simulated and N-BaIoT datasets,
the average detection delay by ODIT-2 for a constant false
alarm rate of 0.01, versus the number of the data points
from the new anomaly type added to the anomaly training
set. In both cases, as the number of the confirmed instances
added to the anomaly training set grows, ODIT-2 detection
delay decreases. The confirmation can be through either a
human expert or a sufficiently high decision threshold for
ODIT which avoids false alarms, as explained in Section
III-D. In the simulated data, ODIT-2 is not able to detect
the new anomaly type at the beginning without seeing any
representative instance. However, even after seeing only a
single instance of the new anomaly type, it is able to detect it
with a reasonable delay around 10. Whereas, in the N-BaIoT
dataset, ODIT-2 is able to detect the unknown anomaly at the
first encounter with an average delay of 0.79, and the average
delay converges to zero as the training set is enhanced with
Fig. 14: Average detection delay of the autoencoder method [35] and ODIT
in terms of number of samples for each device attack scenario.
Fig. 15: False postitive rate of the autoencoder method [35] and ODIT for
each device attack scenario.
instances from the new anomaly type. In this way, ODIT-uni
detects the unknown anomaly types through ODIT, and over
time learns the geometry of new anomalies and improves its
detection performance through ODIT-2.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an algorithm, called ODIT,
that is suitable for quick and accurate anomaly detection
and localization in high dimensional systems which require
multivariate (i.e., joint) monitoring of system components. Our
proposed anomaly detection method is generic and applicable
to various contexts as it does not assume specific data types,
probability distributions, and anomaly types. It only requires
a nominal training set, and achieves asymptotic optimality
in terms of minimizing average detection delay for a given
false alarm constraint. We also showed how to benefit from
available anomalous data (ODIT-2), and presented an online
learning scheme (ODIT-uni) that detects unknown anomaly
types and over time improves its performance by learning
from detected anomalies. We evaluated the performance of our
method in the context of DDoS attack detection and botnet
detection using a simulated dataset and a real dataset. The
experiments verified the advantage of proposed online learning
method, and also showed that the proposed ODIT methods
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Fig. 16: Average detection delay of ODIT-2 vs. number of the new-anomaly
instances added to the training set for simulation and real-data experiments.
significantly outperform the state-of-the-art anomaly/change
detection methods in terms of average detection delay and
false alarm rate.
The proposed algorithms assume static nominal behavior
and a static set of data dimensions. For instance, the proposed
online learning scheme updates its anomaly knowledge in
real-time, but it does not update its nominal data repository.
Extending it to dynamic settings, such as an IoT network with
dynamic topology and changing nominal behavior, remains to
be an important future research direction.
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